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7.1 Influence Strategies and Models of Collective Decision Making
This research studied two inf luence strategies used in col lect ive decision making: the
cxchange .ttrateg\ and the clullenge strateg,y. According to the exchange strategy, an
actor (ego) can choose to behave according to another actor 's (alter 's) wishes in one
instance, in exchange for alter act ing according ego's wishes in another instance.
According to the chal lenge strategy, actors try to lbrce other actors into certain behavior
lry making use of their power, and the distr ibution of support for the various possible
outcomes of the decision. Both inf luence st lategies are directed towards the actions ( i .e.,
voting behavior) of the other actor, and not at the other actor 's preferences. Fol lowing
Parsons' classif icat ion (Parsons 1963; see chapter l) ,  the chal lenge strategy is a typical
coercion strategv. whereas the e.xchange strategy is an inducement strategy. In terrns of
thr. classif icat ions proposed in social psychology, both the chal lenge strategy and the
exchange strategy can be considered open and strong strategies. The chal lenge strategy
is a uni lateral strategy and the exchange strategy is a bi lateral strategy. An exchange
lequires the support of both actors (this assumes a cooperative settrng in which the
actors can communicate and negotiate), whereas chal lenges assume that an actor can
force another actor to behave against his preferences. The exchange strategy sterns from
the social exchange theory. the chal lenge strategy from the lheory of confl ict resolutron.
In the exist ing l i terature, these strategies are analyzed and compared using sirnulat ion
rnodels based on one of the strategies. These simulat ion models provide simpli f ied
descript ions of complex col lect ive decision making situations. The models identi fy the
important factors in col lect ive decision making situations (the actors'plefèrled
posit ions, sal iences, and capabil i t ies), and contain assumptions on the behavior of the
actors. Simulat ion n.rodels faci l i tate the study of the implications of assurnptions on
actor behavior and the effects of these assumptions on the col lect ive outcome.
Simulation models can be used to test the theory they are based on. A test ol '
simulat ion models on empir ical data provides information on the val idity of the rnodel.
and so on the val idity of the theoretical assumptions the model is based on. Of course.
relat ing these empir ical results to the theory is not without problems. For exanrple, the
empir ical tests of models of col lect ive decision making in the exist ing l i terature (e.g.
Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994) are based on data at the col lect ive level (the
col lect ive outcome). But even i f  the model predicts the same outcome as the actual
outcome, this does not necessari ly mean that underlying pÍocess that is modeled lbased
on the actor level assumptions) is the same as the actual underlying process.
Another benefi t  of analyzing sin'rulat ion models is that this develops insight into the
theory underlying the model. A predict ion of a simulat ion model can be seen as a
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consequence of the modeled assumptions, and therefore of the theory used. If thc results
of the model are not consistent with theoretical expectat ions or empir ical f indings, this
should lead to a leappraisement both of the theory and the model based on i t .  This
means that simulat ion models can be a useful tool for theory bui lding.
To study the eÍfect of inf luence strategies in col lect ive decision making, models are
required in which actor behavior regarding inf luence attempts is modeled expl ici t ly. For
both inf- luence strategies the exist ing l i terature provided a sirnulat ion model that rneets
this requirement: Stokman and Van Oosten's exchange model (1994a, 1994b) and
Bueno de Mesquita's expected ut i l i ty model (Bueno de Mesquita et al.  1985; Bueno de
Mesquita 1994). Since the expected ut i l i ty model and the exchange model are based on
the same input variables and lead to the same output variables, comparing the empir ical
results of these models is straightforward. Both rnodels, although based on dif felent
inf luence strategies, predict quite well  (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994: Roler
1996. 1999). However, the models do not always predict the same outcome.
Furthermore, the predict ion errors are not correlated (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman
1994). This could indicate that there are certain condit ions in col lect ive decision rnaking
that determine the best inf luence strateev.
7.2 Research Questions
I f  two simulat ion models are to be used to compare two theories, the conrpeting
assumptions contained in these theories must be captured in the models. However, i f  the
comparison is to be legit imate, this is not suff icient. I t  is also required that dif felences in
the results of these models can only stem from dif ferences in these competing
assumptions, and not from dif ferences in auxi l iary assumptions.
In order to compare two theories using simulat ion models, a framework of f ixed
auxi l iary assumptions is required in which the competing assumptions stemming from
the two theories can be varied. Furthermore, input and output variables are needed that
can serve as points of comparison. In the output variable we need a measure by which
we can decide whether or not the models lead to dif ferent results lAchterkarnp and
lmhof  1999) .
The f irst requirement can be compared to the requirement that in experirnental
lesearch, experiments should be designed in such a way that assumptions are varied in a
structured way. This requirement should also hold in research using simulat ion models.
However, obvious as this seems to be, i t  is easi ly violated when competing theories are
compared by using simulat ion models based on these theories, especial ly i f  the models
are developed by different researchers. Even if the theories share a common framework.
the simulat ion models based on the theories are l ikely to use dif ' ferent auxi l iary
assumptions. Furthermore, the implementation of the simulat ion models in computet
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programs, especial ly i f  this is done by diÍ ferent researchers, can lead to even rnore
dr f l ' e lences  i r r  the  aux i l ia ry  assumpt ions .
Bueno de Mesquita's expected ut i l i ty rnodel and Stokman and Van Oosten's
exchange model do not meet this requirement. since the models dif fer in Ínore respects
than the applied inf luence strategy alone. Dif lèrences in the results of these two models
rnight also stem from diÍ-ferences in, for example, the specif icat ion of the ut i l i ty function
or the specif icat ion of the expected outcome. This means that a comparison oÍ '  the
expected ut i l i ty model and the exchange rnodel does not equate with a comparison of
two competing theories on inf luence strategies. Therefbre, one task in this research was
to rnodify the expected Lrt i l i ty model and the exchange model in such a way that the
modif ied models diÍ fer only in appl ied inf luence strategy. The modif ied models are
called the iterotive erchange model and the challenge ntodeL. The iterative exchange
model and the chal lenge model share a framework of f ixed auxi l iary assumptions: the
perteral motlel.
This research compares the challenge model and the iterative exchange model ttr
investigate the condit ions under which dif Íèrent assumptions about inf- luence st lategics
lead to dif ferent col lect ive outcomes. and the condit ions under which one model
provides better predict ions than the other. However, there is a third question lel i .  Both
the social exchange theory and the theory of confl ict resolut ion assume that the
inf luence strategies the actors use change the col lect ive outcome. But i t  could also bc
true that the col lect ive outcone is already largely determined by the decision making
situation ( i .e..  by the actors'  capabil i t ies. sal iences, and preferences). I t  might hold that
some actors always get theiÍ  way, regardless of the strategy they use. This qucstions
whether an inf luence pÍocess should be incorporated at al l  in a model of col lect ive
decision making. To answer this question, the social exchange theory and the theory of
confl ict resolut ion should not only be compared to each other, but also to a base theory
that uses the same infornration about the decision making situation as the two rnodels,
but does not assume any inf luence.
The research questions formulated for this research are
l. To wltat extettt do the predicted outcomes rÍ'the iterutive erchange ntodtl or tlu,
challenge moclel deviute lrom the predictetl outconrcs oJ a base modeL that os.tutnes
no influence straÍeg,y?
2. To whut ertent do the predicted ouícomes o.l' the iterative exchtmge model lat'iuta
from the pretlicted outcomes of the chullenge ntodel in dffirent collective dctisirnr
ntaking siluations?
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-1. Can sets ol colLective decision making situations be identiJied in which rnc ol thc
three ntodels (the base model, the iïerative exchange model, or the challenge mrxlel)
ltrot;ides better predictions r2l the collecríve outcomes than the other twof
7.3 The Iterative Exchange model and the Challenge model
Chapter 2 presented the general model of col lect ive decision making: a framework of
definit ions and assumptions that hold for both the i terat ive exchange model and the
challenge model. The general model needs only a l imited amount of information on the
actors involved in the decision making: Íheir preferret l  posit ions, suLiences, and
t:t tpuhi l i t ie.s with respect to the issues they have to decide upon. The preferred posit ions
are measured on a unidimensional scale. This scale ranges from 0 to l .  Capabil i t ies and
saliences are also measured on scales that range from 0 to L If  al l  actors involved voted
according their own preferences, the outcome of the col lect ive decision would be
dependent on the actors' preferences in a straightforward way. However, the general
model assumes that actors can inf luence the col lect ive outcome by inÍ luencing each
other. The main assumption of the model on the behavior of the actors is that actors try
to inf luence the voti tg posit ions ( i .e.,  the alternative they vote for) of other actors in
such a way that the col lect ive outcome of the decision comes closer to the outcorne they
preÍèr most.
The general rnodel views col lect ive decision making as a f ive-step process. The f irst
two steps form the single actor level. ln the first step (actor identification) the actors
choose their preÍèrred posit ions and sal iences. This determines their ut i l i ty functions
over the issues (the ut i l i ty of any possible outcome is dependent on the distance between
this outcome and the actor 's preferred outcome, and on the actor 's sal ience). In the
second step ( l lomain evaluation)the actors obtain infbrmation on the ut i l i ty Íunctions of
the other actors. They use this information to estimate the expected col lect ive outcomes
on the issues (by calculat ing the weighted means of the actors'  vot ing posit ions.
weighted by sal ience t imes capabil i t ies) and their ut i l i ty losses caused by these
outcornes. The next two steps Íbrm the interaction level. These steps rnodel the
inf luence process. In step 3 ( inf luence atÍempts), the actors decide which actors they
should inf luence in order to obtain a col lect ive outcome closer to their preÍèrred
position. They propose a change in voting position to these actors. In step 4 (influence
ucceptance), the actors evaluate the proposals they received in the previous step. They
accept the proposals of which they expect the most posit ive (or least negative) elÍ .ects on
the col lect ive outcome and change their voting posit ions according these proposals. The
new expected col lect ive outcome is est imated on the basis of the new voting posrt ions.
The interaction level, steps 3 and 4, are repeated unti l  a rnodel dependent cri tel ion is
Íulf i l led. Final ly, the last step forms the col lect ive action level. In this step (. t lccisirnt
tuking) the predict ion of the col lect ive outcome is determined (by calculatrng the
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weighted means of the actors'  f inal voting posit ions, weighted by sal ience t imes
crpab i l i t ies ) .
The i terat ive exchange model and the chal lenge model only dif fer in the inf luencc
process, that is in steps 3 and 4 of the f ive-step scheme. These cl i f ferences are clcscl ibed
in chapter 3.
The i terat ive exclrange tnodel assumes that actors try to inf luence outcotnes by
ext: l tunges rt f  vot ing posit ions.If  an actor (ego) cares more about issue rt than issue ó
( i .e . .  i f  ego 's  sa l ience on  issue r r  i s  lower  than ego 's  sa l ience on  issue á) .  vo t ing
according to another actor 's (alter 's) wishes on issue ó in exchange lbl alter voting
accolding ego's wishes on issue í,r  means a ut i l i ty gain Íbr ego. I f  al ter 's sal ience
distr ibution is oppositc to that ofego, this exchange is also profi table for alter. The issue
on which ego is wi l l ing to give in is labeled ego's slppl,1 issue, and the issue on which
e-ro hopes to gain from a shiÍ ï  by alter is labeled ego's t lenurul issrte. A combini l t ion ol
two actors ( i  and.D and two issues (a and ó), with issue a lctor I 's demand issue and
issue l ,  uc ror  f ' s  dernand issuc .  und w l re re  an  exchange o f  pos i t ions  is .p lo f r tab le  lO i ' f l * t
actors, is cal led a potential exchange. The exact movès made by the actors are
determined by the e.rchangt'  raÍe used in the model. Chapter 3 dist inguishes four
exchange rates: the equal ut i l i ty gain exchange rate, the exact posit ions exchange rate.
the Nash exchange rate, and the relat ive equal ut i l i ty gain exchange rate. The last three
specif icat ions are used in three versions of the i terat ive exchange model.
The i terat ive exchange model assumes repeated exchange rounds. In every round, the
actors start by determining the potential exchanges they part icipate in (basccl on thc
expected outcomes), and by ordering these by ut i l i ty gain. AÍier this. everv actor
proposes the potential exchange that would provide hirn with the highest ut i l i tv gain. l f
two actors ploposed the same potential exchange to each other, this exchange is
exctuted ( i .e.,  the actors take their new voting posit ions). Since the i telat ive exchange
model assumes hinding exchanges, every actor can use an issue as supply issue in at
most one executed exchange. Furtherntore, actors are al lowed only one cxecuted
exchange in each exchange round. This means that executed exchanges rnake other
potential exchanges forbidden. The actors that did not exchange yet in this e.rclrange
round delete the forbidden potential exchanges from their l ist,  and again prop()sc the
potential exchange on their l ist that would provide them with the highest ut i l i ty gain.
This is repeated as long as there are actors who are able to. and did not ) ict exchnnge in
this round. Afiel the exchange round actors move to new voting posit ions. This leads to
new estimÀtes of the col lect ive outcomes (the weighted meirn of the votrng posit ions,
weighted by sal ience t imes capabil i t ies), which wil l  be used in the fol lowing exchange
round.
The inf luence proposal assumed in the chal lenge model is a chal lenge by ego of a
voting posit ion of alter. I f  ego chal lenges alter on issue rr,  this means that e-uo wants
l 4 l
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alter to take ego's voting posit ion. Actors are assumed to calculate the expected ut i l i ty
of a chal lenge. This expected ut i l i ty depends on the chance that the chal lenge wil l
succeed, and on the ut i l i ty received from the successful chal lenge. The chal lenge model
is based on the assumption that actors wil l  propose those chal lenges from which they
expect ut i l i ty gain (so-cal led potential chal lenges). I fan actor is chal lenged on an issue,
he has to decide whether to accept the chal lenge and give in completcly to the
challenger, to make a compromise and give in part ial ly, or to withstand the chal lenge
( i .e . ,  en ter  a  conf l i c t  s i tua t ion) .
The chal lenge model assumes repeated chal lenge rounds. In every round, the actors
start by determining their potential chal lenges, based on the expected outcomes. The
actors propose every potential chal lenge. After this, the actors evaluate the chal lenges
they received. The chal lenges that generate confl icts do not produce changes rn voting
posit ions. These chal lenges are discarded. For each of the chal lenges to which an actor
perceives he has to give in (part ial ly or completely), he calculates his related ut i l i ty loss.
Subsequently, Íbr every issue, he wil l  compromise or give in to ( i .e.,  exe(Lttc) t l rc
chal lenge that requires the shif t  with the smallest ut i l i ty loss. After the chal lenge lound
actors move to new voting posit ions. This leads to new estimates of the col lcct ive
outcomes, which wil l  be used in the fol lowing chal lenge round.
The chal lenge model and the i terat ive exchange model are not only compared to each
other, but in order to answer the f irst research question, also to a base model that
assumes no inf luence strategy at al l .  The base model used in this research defines the
col lect ive outcome as the weighted mean of the actors'  preferred posit ions, weighted by
capabil i t ies t imes sal ience. I f  the inÍ luence process were left  out of the i terat ive
exchange model or the chal lenge model, the base model is what would be leÍ i .  This
means that the base model only contains step 1,2 and 5 of the general modelr.
7.4 Analyzing Models of Collective Decision Making
Unti l  now, models of col lect ive decision making have been studied and compared by
analyzing their results on empir ical data. However, an investigation of the research
questions by a comparison of the empir ical results of the base model, the i terat ive
exchange model, and the chal lenge model would be very l imited by the lack of
sufficient empirical data. Much effort has already been devoted to the collection of data
on col lect ive decision making situations. However, the avai lable empir ical data sets are
not suff icient for elaborate and structured research on the question of in which col lect ive
decision making situations do the dif ferent assumptions on applied inf luence strategy
lead to dif ferent predict ions. To put this even stronger, i t  is practical ly impossible to
I Notc that without an inÍluence process, the actors' Ílnal voting positions equal their prelèrrcd posi
t ions,  which means that  in the base niodel  stcp 5 cquals step 2.
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col lect enough data to perfbrm a structured search. Situations in which the two rnodels
lead to signif icantly dif ferent results might not be easi ly found in empir ical si tuations as
it  is not clear which condit ions are important. Furthermore, using empir ical data. i t  is
not possible to structural ly test the ef lect of srnal l  changes in a col lect ivc decision
making situation.
To conclude, the avai lable empir ical data are not suff icient to study resei irch
questions I and 2. However, the avai lable data are used to answer Íesearch qr-rest ion 3
(about the relat ive predict ive power of the base model, the chal lenge model, and the
iterat ive exchange model).  Furthermore, three alternative exchange rates were specif ied
for the i terat ive exchange model, and empir ical data were also used to determine which
speci i icat ion leads to the best predict ions. The best one was chosen as the exchange rate
in the velsion of the i terat ive exchange model that is used to investigate research
questions I and 2.
To study research questions I and 2, the present research uses tests of the simulal ion
mode ls  no t  on  empi r i ca l  da ta .  bu t  on 's i rnu la ted  da ta ' .  Th is  means tha t  s i rnu la t ion
comes in at two parts oíthis research: not only in the simulat ion models to simulate thc
process of col lect ive decision rnaking, but also in the simulated data to test these
models. A rnethodological contr ibution of this research is to i l lustrate the benel ' i ts of
using computer simulat ions with simulated data. Computer simulat ion carr be used both
to study the implications of the dif lèrent assumptions of two competing theories ancl to
locate aÍeas in the input space in which these competing theories lead to di l ' f 'erent
predict ions. This research, next to the work of, Íbr instance, Cohen et a. l .  (19'12),
Axeh'od (1987), and Zeggelink (1994, 199ó), shows that computer simulat ions r"rsing
simulated data generate more insights into the consequences of model lssurnptions.
Sinulated data faci l i tates a much more structured analysis of the ef ' Íect of input
variables on model outcomes than empir ical data can. Therefore, i t  can show certain
patterns and efÍècts, that could not be found i f  results on empir ical data alone were
avai lable.
However, running a rnodel on sirnulated data can never Íunction as a test of lhe
val idity of the model, since there is no actual outcome that can scrve as a relcrence
point. Results of analyses on simulated data can only provide insights into the
simulat ion model, and therefore into the theory, but never about real i ty. The lesults
should be viewed as hypotheses, that st i l l  have to be tested on ernpir ical data. Only after
confirmation of these hypotheses. has sr.rpport of the val idity of the model and the theorv
been obtained. I f  the hypotheses are rejected, the theory and the model should be
rmproved. The present research showed, fbr instance. that a consequence of the
assumptions of the i terat ive exchange model is that actors on opposite extremes i lre
l ikely to exchange with each other. Whether this holds in real i ty, can only be testecl by
col lect ing empir ical data on the actors that execute exchanges. l f  these data levcal. Íbr
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example, that actors on opposite extremes hardly ever execute exchanges ( i t  is
imaginable that extrerne leÍ i-wing part ies and l ight-wing part ies refuse to talk to cach
other). thcn the assurnption that al l  actors can exchange with cach other should bc
leconsidered.
This rnakes clear that fbr lesearch using computer simulat ions to be useful.  thc
clesign of the simulat ions should be structured by theory. Theoretical expectat ions or
empir ical results are needed to guide the analysis and to interpret the results. To perÍbrm
a structured comparison clf  the base model, the chal lenge model, and the i terat ive
exchange model using simulated data, a simulat ion design had to be developed. To
lunswer the questions on how the actors'  attr ibutes aÍ-fected the rnodels'  oulcomes, a
stmctured search throush the input space was needed. The concept of Lrsue 7l 'r , l i l r 'sr war
developecl to structure the input space. Furthermore, the explanatory variables used to
analyze the simulat ion results were based on theoretical assumptions and on Íhe results
o1' analyt ical deductions of the eÍfects of the model assumptions in small  clecision
mak ing  s i tua t ions .
7.5 Results of the Analvses
7'c.sÍs ott Entpiríc'ul Dutu
Chapter 4 presents an empir ical test of the chal lenge model, the three versions of the
itcrat ive exchange rnodel, and three base models. Base models I  and 2 are velv simple
nrodels. Base model I  defines the col lect ive outcome as the (non-weighted) mearr oÍ. the
actor 's preferred posit ions. and base model 2 defines the col lect ive outcome as weighted
rnean of the preferred posit ions, rveighted only by the capabil i t ies. Base model 3 defines
the col lect ir ,e outcorre as the weighted mean of the actors'preferred posit ions. $,ei-ghted
by capabil i t ies t imes sal ience. The results of the i terat ive exchange model and the
challenge model were also cornpared to the results of Stokman and Van Oosten's
cxchange rnodel and Bueno de Mesquita's expected ut i l i ty model, where thesc lesult are
ava i lab le .
The models are tcsted on four data sets: Bueno dc Mesquita and Stokrnan's data on
European Community decision making (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokmun 1994),
Ro.jer 's data on col lect ive i lsreement negotiat ions in the Netherlands (Rojer 199ó.
1999), Payne's dataon the decisions on the reform ofthe Structural Funds involving
Ireland (Payne et al.  I  997, Payne I 999), and Kónig's data on social pol i t ical decisions of
the  E i r ropean Un ion  (Kón ig  1997) .
Notc that  in thc computer s imulat ions using s imulated data,  the word' issue'does nol
substant ive dccis ion.  but  only a conÍ igurat ion of  s imulated data,  that  is  thc values ol '
prc lèrre 'd posi t ions.  sal  icnces and capabi l i t rcs.
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The empir ical tests clearly support the i terat ive exchange model. The Nash exchange
rate gives the best overal l  results, and therefore the Nash-iterat ive exchange modcl was
used in the cornputer simulat ions of chapter 5. With regard to the chal lenge mode l ,  the
situation is less clear. The chal lenge model produces results far worse than the i tcrat ive
exchange rnodel, especial ly on Rojer 's and Payne's data col lect ions. However, Pavne's
one-issue data sets supported the chal lenge model, and Rojer 's col lect ivc decision
making situations can be viewed as typical exchange situations.
Base rnodel 3 produces remarkably good overal l  results. This supports the
assumption that col lect ive decision making situations can be described very wcl l  using
only the informaticlrr on the actors'  preÍèrences, sal iences, and capabil i t ies. This ulscr
indicates that the predict ive power of the i terat ive exchange model and the chal lcnge
model is at least part ly based on good input data. However' ,  the Nash-iterat ive exchange
model 's predict ive power is higher than base model 3's predict ive power. Therelbre.
good assumptions on exchange strategies make a dif ference. The chal lenge rnodel 's
predict ive power is worse than base moclel 3's predict ive power. However. the highcr
predict ive power of the expected ut i l i ty model as found in other research (Bucno de
Mesqu i ta  e t  a l .  1985;  Bueno de  Mesqu i ta  1994)  shows tha t  good assumpt i ( )ns  ( )n
challenge strategies also lead to better results than the base nrodel.
Base model 3 is the base rnodel whose results were compared to the rcsults ol '
chal lenge model and the i terat ive exchange model, in order to answer research questions
I  and 3 .
The empir ical tests show that the predict ions of Stokrnan and Van Oosten's cxchange
model and Bueno de Mesquita's Expected Uti l i ty model are not as similar as suggcsted
in other research (e.g.. Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994). This holds even stronger
lor the i telat ive exchange model and the chal lenge model. Therefore, i t  is useful trr
identi fy the col lect ive decision making situations in which the models dif fcr rnost. Thc
present research fbcuses only on condit ions that can be Íbund in the configurations ol
the input data of the models ( i .e, in the distr ibutions ol the actors'  preÍèrences, sal icnces.
and capabil i t ies). However, the empir ical results also point towards condit ions bascd on
the embeddedness of the decision making in a larger sett ing. ' I 'he good results of the
exchange models on Payne's and Rojer 's data for instance. suggest that exchanqes are
very l ikely in situations in which a number of decisions are decided upon at the samc
moment, by actors that wi l l  meet again in fbrthcoming negotiat ions. I t  would also be
interesting to study these kinds of condit ions.
Atralyt ical deduc t iutt s
Analyt ical deduction and computer simulat ions on simulated data were used to address
the f irst two research questions. The analyt ical deductions as presented in chapter '5 rver-e
focused on the condit ions for potential chal lenges and exchanges. These moclel-
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dependent condit ions are too complex to provide much insight into the effects oÍ ' the
actors'  preferred posit ions, sal iences and capabil i t ies on their offering of ploposals. To
gain more insight, the condit ions were rewrit ten and compared. Table I summarizes the
lesults ofchaoter 5.
Table I shows that the condit ions Íbr potential exchanges and potential chal lenges are
similar in certain respects. However, even i f  the i terat ive exchange model and the
challenge rnodel predict proposals that recluire the same actor to shif t  his posit ion. i t  is
possible that the i terat ive exchange rnodel predicts a small  move whereas the chal lenge
model predicts a complete acceptance of the chal lenger's posit ion. Moreover. whether
the potential chal lenges and exchanges are accepted and executed by alter is dependent
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potential chal lenge.
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capabil i t ies on lhe issue.
E,go chal lenges alter to move alter 's
posit ion towards ego's posit ion i f  and
only i f  ego's sal ience is lalger than the
r-rpper bound and alter 's sal ience is
lower than the lower bound.
In most two-against-one situations
(with respect to the configuration of
the actors' preíerred outcomes) the
single actor has to give in to the
challenges of the other actors.
The i terat ive exchange model requi les
at least two actors (who take dif ferent
pos i t ions)  and two issues  Ío r  any
potential exchange.
The condit ions for potential exchanges
lead to :rn upper bound on the r ' i l t io of
the inf luencer's and inf luenced actor 's
sal ience: this upper bound depends
only on the inf luencer's and
inf luenced actor 's sal iences on thc
othel issue in the exchange.
An exchange between ego and alter,
with this issue as alter 's supply issue
( i .e . .  rvhere  a l te r  rnoves  h is  pos i t ron
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on the proposals alter receives lrom other actors. However, this is too cornplex to
analyze analyt ical ly.
The lesults of the analyt ical deductions were used in the design of the cornputer
simulat ions, and in the choice of explanatory variables of the regression analy.. ;es on the
rcsu l ts  o f  the  s imu lu t ions .
Contputer Simulution.s using Simulated Datu
The analyses of the outcomes of the computer simulat ions using simulated data were
fbcused on (the dif ferences between) the outcomes predicted by the chal lenge rnodel and
the i terat ive exchange rnodel. Chapter 6 presents the design and the results of the
sirnulat ions. The design had to structure the search through the possible input
configurations. Since i t  is not feasible to test every possible configuration. a structured
l inri tat ion of the input space was needed. The f irst l imitat ion concerns the number o1'
actors and issues. Only three, Íbur, and f ive-actor si tuations, involving two or lhree
issues were used in the analyses. The posit ions these actors could take were l imited
using the concept of pov:er block.s and issue proJïles.
Power bktcks ite defined as groups of actors that have very close prefelred positions
on an issue. There are a few dist inguishable cases: ( l)  the case in which one power
block has almost al l  the exercised power, (2) the case of only two competing power
blocks, (3) the case of three competing power blocks (this al lows the fbrrnation of
coal i t ions between two power blocks), and (4) cases with more than thlee powerful
groups. The most inrportant teatures (competing power blocks, coal i t ion torrnation
bc'trveen power blocks) are captured in cases with three power blocks. Although the
addit ion of more power blocks increases the possibi l i ty of interactions between power'
blocks, the computer simulat ions are l i rnited to issues with maximally three power
groups. Since issues with al l  actors in one power block are not interesting (the col lect ive
outcome is by definit ion equal to the prefèrred outcome of the power block), the
simulat ions are l imited to issues involving two or three power blocks. l t  is assurrcd that
the extreme preferred positions (0 and l) are always taken by at least one actor.
Therefore, two-power-block issues have one leÍt  power block (on posit ion 0) and one
right power block (on posit ion l) .  The three-power-block issues have a left .  a rniddle
and a r ight power block. In the simulat ions. the middle power block was posit ioned at
the value 0.40. This posit ion is far enough from both extreme posit ions to be recognized
as a separate power block.
Two kinds of power blocks are dist inguished: ( l)  non-divisible pow,er bl.ock.s
consist ing of only one actor, and (2) divisible power blocks consist ing of a gloup of
actors. [n the simulat ions, maximally three actors are part of a power block.
The idea o f  d iv is ib le  and non-d iv is ib le  power  b locks .  w i th  the  l i rn i ta t ion  o f  a
maximum of three power blocks on an issue. and the requirement that three, four or f ive
rvide much insight into the effects o1'
rbi l i t ies on their oÍÍèring of proposals.
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actors are involved, leads to the design of a l imited number of issue profi les. An i .ssae
prc.t ' i le describes the distr ibution of the actors'  posit ions over the two or three power'
blocks. Chapter 6 uses three dif ferent issue profi les for three-actor si tuations, six
dif t 'erent issue profi les for four-actor si tuations, and eight dif ferent issue plof i les for '
f ive-actor si tuations (see table I of chapter 6).
The issue profi les detennine only the actors'preÍ-erred posit ions. The input spacc
contains not only the preferred posit ions, but also the actors'  sal iences and capabil i t ies.
The selection of a f ixed set of possible sal iences and capabil i t ie.s provided another
l imitat ion on the input space: both sal iences and capabil i t ies can only be eithel low
(0 .50)  o r  h igh  (  1 .00) .
Chapter 6 dist inguishes two roles that an actor may have: a f ixecl role, whiclr rneans
an actor has the sarne posit ion on al l  issues in an exchange ( i .e.,  on al l  issues the actor
has either the left  extreme, middle, or r ight extreme posit ion), and a rnixed rolc, which
nreans that an actor can have an extreme posit ion on one issue and a middle posit ion on
another issue in the exchange.
Even with these restr ict ions, the issue profi les lead to a vast number of possible issue
configurations. Therefore, a r i indom selection was made. The sirnulat ions were
restr icted to situations in which al l  actors are involved in al l  issr"res. As a result.  the sets
of three-actor issue profi les, Íbur-actor issue proíi les, and f ive-actor issue profi les were
treated separately.
The resuits of the simulat ions were analysed by means of I inear regression analyses.
The explanatory variables used were based on the results of the analyt ical decluctions of
chapter 5, and on expectat ions about the effects of dif ferent issue profi les. This led to
two kinds of explanatory variables: measlrres of the expected di lect ions of chal lenges
and exchanges, and transformations of the actors'  sal iences and capabil i t ies into
variables that dist inguish (1) the posit ion of the middle actor, (2) whether rn actor is an
extreme actor, and (3) whether the actor is part of a single-actor or a mult i- lctof power
block. One more explanatory variables was added to these: the outcome of the base
model ( i .e.,  the weighted mean of the actors'  preferred posit ions, weighted by sal ience
times capabil i t ies). The use of the base model 's outcome as an explanatory variable
al lows the study of the question of the extent to which the outcomes of the i terat ive
exchange model and the chal lenge model dif fer from the base model (research question
r  ) .
Table 9 of chapter 6 summarizes the results of the three-actor, two-issue unalyses
under the assumption of f ixed roles. Some of the results are weaker i f  more actors or
issues are added, or i f  mixed roles are assumed. Table 2 provides an overview of the
results of the computer simulat ions using sinrulated data (based largely on table 9 ol '
chapter 6). Note that the result on a specif ic explanatory variable is obtainecl control l ing
for the other variables.
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. The larger the base model 's outcome, lhe closer the chal lenge model 's outcornc is
to the r ight extreme.
. The more Íhe expected direct ion of a chal lenge is towards the r ight extreme, the
closer lhe chal lenge nrodel 's outcome is to the r ight extreme.
. For al l  actors part of an (extended) rnult i-actor power block. i t  holds that thc lzrrqcr
the actor 's sal ience, the more the chal lenge model is pul led towards the (extcndcd)
mult i-actol power block extreme. Furthermore, the adjusted sal iences of ext letne
actors have more impact than those of middle actor.s (if they are part of an
(extended) mult i-actor power block). The sante relat ions hold for the actors'
(adlusted) capabil i t ies, but to a lesser degree.
Iterative Exchange Model
. The larger the base model 's outcome, Lhe closer the i terat ive exchange model 's
outcome is to the left  extreme.
, The more the direct ion of an exchange between extreme actors is towards the r ight
extreme, the closer the i terat ive exchange model 's outcome is to thc r ight extrerne.
. For al l  actors i t  holds that Íhe lorg,er an actor 's capabil i t ies, the /css the outcolne
l ies towards the extreme closest to the actoÍ. The adjusted capabil i t ies of extrente
actors have more impact than those of middle actors. The capabil i t ies of the
middle actors have almost no irnpact i f  these actors are single actors.
.  For extreme actors i t  also holds that the Iurger an actor 's sal iences, the le.r,r  the
outcome l ies towards the extreme closest to the actor. but to a lesser degree than
Íbr the actors'  capabil i t ies. The pattern is less clear for middle actors: for three-
actor simulat ions i t  holds that the larger the middle actor 's sal ier lces, the lrr,rrc rhe
outcome l ies towards the extreme closest to the actor, but for four-actor and ï ivc-
actor simulat ions the opposite holds. Al l  si tuations show that the sal iences of
middle actors have almost no impact i f  these actors are single actors.
.  Under the assumption of mixed roles, not only the direct ion of exchanges beween
actors at extreme posit ions (on the tested issue, not necessary on the issue on
which i t  is tested against) is important, but also the exchanges involving acrors at
middle posit ions (who may take extreme posit ions on the second issue) play a role,
t
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Deviat ion between Iterat ive Exchange Model and Challenge Model
. Tlre larger the base nrodel's outcome, the more the challenge model's outcome
lies further to the r ight than the i terat ive exchange model 's outcome.
. The lurger Íhe difference between the expected direction of a challenge and the
direction of an exchange between the extreme actors, the larger the deviltion
between the i terat ive exchange model 's outcome and the chal lenge model 's
outcome.
. The larger the actors'  sal iences and capabil i t ies, the lurger the deviat ion between
the i terat ive exchange model 's outcorne and the chal lenge model 's outco[le .
. Actors have more impact if they are part of a multi-actor power block, than if they
are single actors.
.  Extreme actors have more imoact than middle actors.
The large regression coeff icients associated with the variable containing the base
rnodel 's outcome in the regression analyses of the simulat ion results show that the
outcomes of the challenge model and the iterative exchange model are captured for a
large part by the outcome of the base rnodel. This shows that good input variables (the
actols'  prefèrred posit ions, sal iences and capabil i t ies), and the expected outcomc based
on the weighted mean of the ( init ial) voting posit ions, weighted by exercised power,
exp la in  a  subs tan t ia l  par t  o f  co l lec t i ve  dec is ion  mak ing .  Both  the  base mode l ' s  var iab les
and the base model 's specif icat ion of the expected outcome are also used in the
challenge model and i terat ive exchange model. To conclude, they play an important part
in the predict ive power of these models. However, not only the base model 's outcome
had high regression coeff icients. The expected direct ions of chal lenges and exchanges,
and, to a lesser degree, the actors'  capabil i t ies and sal iences also play a majol palt  in
expl i . ining the outcomes of the chal lenge model and the i terat ive exchange model. This
indicates that the inf luence processes change the col lect ive outcome. Thereforr. i t  can
be concluded that the incorporation of an inf luence process in models of col lect ive
decision nraking does make a dif ference.
The computer simulat ions showed clearly the importance of the direct ions of
chal lenges and exchanges in explaining the results of the chal lenge model and the
itelat ive exchange model, and the importance of the dif ference in these direct ions in
explaining the deviat ions between these models. What kinds of col lect ive decision
rnaking situations lead to dif f-erent direct ions of chal lenges and exchanges' l  The
challenge model predicts that the outcome moves towards the extreme of the (extended)
mult i-actor powel block. Remember that al l  actors in an issue configuration lre
designed to have either high or low sal iences and capabil i t ies (randomly chosen).
Therefore, an (extended) mult i-actor power block is l ikely to have more exercised power
than a single-actor powel block. The analyses show that the model predict ions dif fer
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most i f  actors in the most powerful power block ( i .e.,  actors in the most powerful
coal i t ion) use the issue as a supply issue. This happens in two kinds of col lect ive
decision making situations. In the f irst kind, the high exercised power of the tnost
powerful coal i t ion is clue to the high capabil i t ies of i ts members, but not to high
sal ience. Here, the chal lenge model predicts, on the basis of the high exercised power
(clue to the high capabil i t ies), that the powerful coal i t ion wins the issue, whereas the
iterat ive exchange model predicts, on the basis of the low sal ience, that actols in the
powerful coal i t ion give in on the issue. In the second kind of col lect ive decision making
situations, the same actors are part of the most powerful coal i t ion on al l  issues.
According to the chal lenge model, these actors win on al l  issues. However, according to
the i terat ive exchange model, these actors st i l l  rnake concessions on issues that are of
less (and possibly only a l i t t le less) interest to them.
The octoÍ 's sal iences have more irnpact on the chal lenge model, whereas the actors'
capabil i t ies have more impact on the i terat ive exchange model. BLrt of course. in thc
latter case, the actors'  sal iences are already captured in the measures of the expected
directions ofexchanges. Therefore, i t  can be concluded that in both models the actors'
sal iences matter more than their capabil i t ies. This means that i t  is not an actol 's
potential power, but the effort he rnakes to affect the col lect ive outcome that detelnt ines
how much an actor inÍ luences the col lect ive outcome.
Fulthelrnore, the sal iences and capabil i t ies o1'actors have nrore impact i f  the actors
are part of a mult i-actor power block ( i .e.,  i f  they are part of more powerful coal i t ions).
o r  i f  the  ac tors  t l ke  ex t reme pos i t ions .
The analyses of actors with nrixed roles showed that the i terat ive exchange rrtodel
predrcts that inf luencing the outcome by exchanging is especial ly prof i table for actols
who are on opposite extremes on al l  issues, or at least on a large number of issues.
The explained variance of the analyses of the i terat ive exchange model in two-issue
situations is very high, but the addit ion of extra issues leads to a sharp reduction of the
explained variance. Adding extra issues does not inf luence the explained variance of the
challenge model, but adding an extra actor does lead to a lower level of explained
variance. This means that the srnal l  decision-nraking situations, the outcomes oÍ '  the
iterat ive exchange model and the chal lenge model can be predicted quite well  using the
regression equations based on the explanatory variables. However. in larger decision
rnaking situations, the rnodels become too complex to approximate their results by a
simple l inear regression.
Reluting simulated tlata results Ío empirical duta resuLts
The computer simulat ions using simulated data analyzed only small  si tuations (three to
f ive actors, two or three issues). To test whether these results can be general ized to
larger, empir ical sett ings, chapter 6 performed a similar regression analysis on a subset
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of Rojer 's data. Some of the effects found on the simulated data also show up in the
ernpir ical data. The base model 's outcome is st i l l  an important variable, as are the
actors'  sal iencies and capabil i t ies. Again, the mult i-actor power block actors have most
inrpact. The analyses ofthe i terat ive exchange nrodel again show that the capabil i t ies ol '
extreme actors have a larger impact. However, other effects are not confirmed in the
empir ical analyses. Furthermore, the measure of the direct ion oÍ 'exchanges as uscd in
the analyses on the simulated data could not be used in the test on the empir ical data.
Therefbre. a new measure of the expected direction of exchanges had to be developed.
Nevertheless, this new measure also shows the importance of the expected direct ion of
exchanges on Íhe i terat ive exchange nrodel. and the importance of the diÍ fèrence
between the expected direct ions of chal lenges and exchanges on the dif felence between
the model results.
7.6 Concluding Remarks
The present research had two objectives. First, research questions were formulated
concerning deviat ions in the results of a r lodel based on the exchange strategy, a model
based on the chal lenge strategy, and a base rnodel that assumes no inl ' luence process at
al l .  Second. the value of research u-sing conrputer simulat ion, by u.sing simulat ion
models and test ing these models an sintulated data, was questioned.
The results of the tests on empir ical data and simulated data provide answers to the
three research questions. Summarized, the answers are as fol lows. ( l)  Although the
predict ions of the chal lenge model and the i terat ive exchange model are captured for a
large part by the base rnodel 's predict ions. the incorporation of an inf luence strategy
does make a dif fèrence. (2) The deviat ion between the predict ions of the i terat ive
exchange model and the chal lenge model can be explained to a .substantial extent by the
diÍferences in the (expected) direct ions of chal lenges and exchanges, and by the actors'
sal iences and capabil i t ies, especial ly i f  these actors are part of a mult i-actor power
block, or i f  they take extreme posit ions. (3) The i terat ive exchange model with the Nash
exchange rate showed the best overal l  predict ive power. The base model showed
remarkably good overal l  results, while the results of the chal lenge model were poor.
What can be said about the value of research based on computer simulat ion' l  The
simulation models used in this research Íaci l i tated a structured compari-son of the
diÍferent assumptions on inf luence strategies used in the models. Furthermore, the use of
sirnulated data al lowed a structured search of the input space, which led to insights into
the i terat ive exchange model and chal lenge model that could not have been deduced i f
ernpir ical data alone had been used.
However, this research also showed that research based on computer simulat ion is
only useful under certain condit ions. First of al l ,  i t  should be st lessed that a cornpurison
between sirnulat ion models is only usetul i f  the rnodels meet a number of requiremenls.
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including the requirement that the models may dif fer only in the competrng
assumptions, and not in other auxi l iary assumptions. In the present research, this rneant
that two exist ing simulat ion models based on competing assumptions on inf luence
strategies could not be used direct ly. First they had to be modif ied in such a way rhat rhe
modif ied models only dif feled in the inf luence strategy applied.
Fulthennore, computer simulat ion al lows a search through the input space. I t  is
important that a design is developed to structure this search, and to structure the analysis
of the data obtained. Without such a design, the search result in a mountain of data that
is problematic, or even impossible, to analyze. Both the structuring of the input spacc
arrd the analysis of the data should be guided by theory. In the present research, the
concept of issue profi les was used to structure the input space. Theoretical expectat ions
(part ly based on analyt ical deduction) were used to develop the explanatory variables
used in the regression analyses ofthe sirnulat ion results.
of course, the results of simulat ion rnodels on simulated data can only provide
insights into (diÍ fèrences between) the theories. The results are theorerical ly foundecl
hypotheses, but only tests of these hypotheses on ernpir ical data can provicie insights
into the val idity of the underlying theories.
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